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The Supreme Court: Viable Fallibilism or
Fatal Infallibilityt
Bernard Goodwin*
The recent growth in the importance and apparentpower of the
Supreme Court has been one result of our rapidly changing
twentieth century society. In the social ferment of the last two
decades, the Court, more than Congress, has expressed the
conscience and intellectual consensus of American culture. Speaking
as a practicing attorney and concerned citizen, the author of this
article does not criticize the Court Jbr stepping into this gap in our
governntentalstructure, but he frels that the possibilit. of increased
activism on the part of the Court indicates a serious breakdown in
governmental checks and balances and tnay be leading to the 'fa~tal
infWlibility" of the judicial branch. After tracing the historical
events which have eroded the ideas of the franers of the
Constitution, Mr. Goodwin suggests two ways to restore the Court
to a positlonm of "viable Jallibilism'"that retains the confidence of
the people and reinstates the original balance. He advocates a
permanent panel,of judges and citizens to assist in the inportant
process of.judicial selection, and he outlines a procedure by which
the Constitution nar be nore easily amended in response to
changingsocial needs and urgent problems.

Much has been written on the Supreme Court.' Since it has been
and still is the fashion to give vent to jeremiads about the Court or just

to review and analyze its decisions and to probe the personalities and
policies of Justices, not many writers have been constructive in giving
T "Viable fallibilism," as used herein, refers to effective checks and balances and controls
(as planned by the framers of the Constitution) over the potential omnipotence of any office, body,
or institution in government.
"Fatal infallibility," as used herein, refers to the omission or gradual destruction of such checks
and balances and controls, including the constantly occurring deterioration in the representative
form of government so carefully designed by the framers to check the ultimate perils of an
uncontrolled mass democracy, especially when influenced and guided by those who tend to make
an absurd fetish of democracy in all of its dangerously exaggerated extremes.
* J.D., Harvard University; Member of New York (New York City) and Washington Bars.
I. It is unnecessary to cite the numerous articles and books on the Supreme Court.
Published periodical indexes and library reference cards will furnish a complete list. For 3 recent
articles, see Kurland, Wanted: A NonpoliticalSupreme Court, 56 NATiON's Bus. 87 (May, 1968);
Kurland, The Court Should Decide Less and Explain More, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1968, § 6
(Magazine), at 34; Hogan, The Supreme Court and Natural Law, 54 A.B.A.J. 570 (1968). See
also M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS 520-48 (1967).
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basic suggestions for preserving and improving the Court as the
conscience and fulcrum of our Government. It was Spinoza who said,
"It is the part of a wise man not to bewail nor to deride, but to
understand."'2 Or, as it was more colloquially phrased in the aphorism
of an unknown Chinese humanist, "It is better to light one candle than
to curse the darkness." '3 To follow such sound advice, it would be
relevant to examine the need for the Court as a political, social, and
moral institution in our Society.
I.

EROSION OF THE ORIGINAL IDEA

Prior to the pragmatic rationatism and rule of reason of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, most peoples during 6,000 years
of known history created and maintained their societies4 by the
inspiration and cement of fear or love of some form of divinity. This
may have been a covenant with God (such as the dialogue between God
and the Old Testament Hebrews),5 or a divine right to rule (e.g., the
English Plantagenets, Tudors and Stuarts, and the French prerevolution monarchs), or a doctrine of apotheosis whereby a sovereign,
in tracing his ancestry to the Godhead, himself became a god (as with
the Minoan kings, Egyptian pharaohs and Roman caesars), or a
reliance on reverence and respect for supreme and sacred oral and
traditional law and unwritten customs (natural law) as being in
themselves of divine origin and thus superior to state and individual
(the ancient Greeks and pre-empire Romans).' However, with the
relatively new devotion to a completely secular state, separated from
religion, church, divinity, and the Godhead, by seventeenth and eighteenth century political philosophers, it became absolutely essential for
the founding fathers (of the United States) to devise a substitute
amalgam for the stability of the state. James Madison described the
suggested substitute as a political system of checks and balances, and
wrote about it in The Federalist:
But the great security, against a gradual concentration of the several powers in
2. Elwes, Introductionto 1 WORKS OF SPINOZA at xxii (Dover ed. Elwes transl. 1955).
3. B. BOHL, THE HOME BOOK OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 72 (1967). This quotation was
the inspiration for the title of the autobiography, To Light a Candle, by the founder of The
Christophers, Father James Keller.
4. A.J. Toynbee lists 21 complete civilizations, I TOYNBEV, A STUDY OF HISTORY, Pt. I
C(ii), at 129 (2d ed. 1935, 4th impr. 1948), as well as a number of abortive civilizations, 2 id. pt.
II D(vii), at 322-60, 369-94, and arrested civilizations, id. pt. Ill A, at I.
5. B. SPINOZA, A Theologico-Political Treatise, in I WORKS OF SPINOZA 47 (Dover ed,
Elwes transl. 1955).
6. See Hofstadter & Pesner, Judges as Legislators, 19 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 222, 227
nn.8, 9, 10 (1964).
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the same department, consists of giving to those who administer each department
the necessary Constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments
of the others. The provision for defence must in this, as well as in all other cases,
be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the
Constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that
such devices [checks and balances among the different departments of government]
should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government
itself, but the greatest of all [adverse] reflections on human nature? If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies
in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed, and in the
next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the
primbry control on the government;
but experience has taught mankind the
7
necessity of auxiliaryprecautions.

The concern of the founding fathers that one of the three branches
of government would emerge as more powerful than the others led to
the system of checks and balances, with constitutional amendment

procedures to provide for any impasse among the branches or for any
contingencies of the unknown future. The reasoning was simple: the

infallibility of the majority (represented by the legislative branch, the
Congress), of the few (represented by the judicial branch, the Supreme

Court), and of the one (represented by the executive branch, the
President) was equally to be feared. Even though the authoritarian
absolutism of Jean Jacques Rousseau, with his doctrine of the mystical

general will giving birth to a mysterious infallibility of the masses,
together with a melange of Montaigne, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Locke,
Harrington, the Old and New Testaments, Greek and Roman
philosophies, and the Magna Charta, strongly influenced eighteenth

century American political thought, the framers of the Constitution
were sufficiently wise to temper Utopian theories with realism.
When John Marshall became Chief Justice in 1801, however, this

most important contribution of checks and balances to political science
began to lose its equilibrium with the development of the Supreme

Court as the final force in government. Since then, American political,
social, and economic life has been molded and proliferated by the

Court's philosophy, which changes chameleon-like with the
personalities and policies of the Justices. It would seem that Plato's
2,500-year-old ideal of a permanent government by philosopher kings

had finally become a reality, for, with the anointment of appointment,
Justices were cloaked with charismatic infallibility. But, inevitably

because of this, the Court slowly evolved from its original position as
7.

THE FEDERALIST

No. 51, at 356 (B.F. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (emphasis added).
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an equal, well-checked and finely balanced unit, in the harmonious
composition of the triptych of the Federal Constitution, to its present
sublime status of primus interpares.

This disturbing erosion flows fundamentally from a failure to
recognize society's need for a realistic system of checks and balances
that strengthens its sinews for survival. Such a system of fallibilism is
the only effective control over philosopher kings (the Supreme Court)
who function only if they are respected as having obvious intellectual
superiority and unquestioned integrity in the context of the current
mores. By contrast, the imposition on peoples of unavoidable or
arbitrary infallibility in their institutions has invariably caused
governmental systems in this and other civilizations to decline from the
Hellenic perfectionism of Platonist philosopher kings to autocratic
oligarchy and demagogic democracy, in either order, and lastly to fall
to tyranny; and then the holocaust.
One significant result of the turbulent upheavals of the twentieth
century, with their concomitant changes in social, political, and
economic institutions, has been an accelerated weakening of the system
of checks and balances. It was the Warren Court, more than the
President or Congress, that tried to cope with the anomie of American
culture during the fermentations of the last two decades. The Court will
undoubtedly take its place in history as outstandingly courageous in its
attempt to fill the gap of guidance in these times of contumacious
confusion. At the very least, the Court has been an escape valve for
the frequently anemic, and too often selfish or shortsighted, politics of
the legislative and executive branches of government, compounded by
their dependence for election to office on divisive, and thus enervating,
economic, ethnic, geographic, racial, and religious groups. This activity
of the Court, as the only agency to serve as the social conscience and
to express the intellectual consensus of society, is referred to by one
commentator as both proper and necessary for its survival. He goes on
to say:
In the Middle Ages the institution that performed this watchdog function was the
Church. Post-Reformation confidence in the individual allowed transfer of this
function to the individual conscience.
American society is now a secular society. .

.

. The churches are certainly not

strong enough as institutions to reassume the medieval function of passing
judgment on the state and standing up against it. The Supreme Court, as a focus
of the community's conscience, is the strongest institution available to do the job.

The inevitable concentration in the Court of ultimate control over
8. See Davis, Toward Justifying Democracy, 33 THE KEY
9.

Hogan, supra note I, at 572.

REPORTER 2,4

(1967-68).
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the destiny of society, without operative checks and balances on itself,
will become dangerously destructive with the full flowering of fatal
infallibility. This becomes more evident with a rapidly moving, activist
Supreme Court, such as the Warren Court. It is understandable that,
in order to perform its part, the Court must remain flexible in its
continuing ability to adjust to new jurisprudence, new justice, and new
moral values (in the best traditions of Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, and
Pound). 0 Nevertheless, even though the Court may be pinpointed by
posterity as having from time to time successfully rescued American
culture, it will eventually negate its necessary place in society if it fails
to retain a viable fallibilism.
Consequently, the burgeoning power of the brilliantly conceived
institution of the Supreme Court must be curbed by modernizing the
original checks and balances in two ways: first, by wiser, better judicial
appointments of Justices resulting from a more immunized method of
selection and appointment; and, second, by a more responsive, flexible,
and efficient constitutional amendment procedure.
II.

IMPROVEMENT OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION

When fallible humans in becoming infallible Justices can overnight
be transmuted to gods of constitutional law, the quality of each
appointment to the Court becomes of great importance. It is not
sufficient to rely on replacements due to-deaths and resignations or on
the startling growth of some Justices either with the first donning of
their Supreme Court robes or in the annealing process of continuing
service on the Court. Inasmuch as the apocalyptic opinions of the
divine nine are necessarily born in subconscious subjectivity, and any
appeal from the Court can only be to the written Constitution and the
elusive true intent thereof as interpreted from time to time by the
Court, each Justice, irrespective of precedent or of other Justices past
or present, is always his own arbiter of constitutional law, but within
the penumbra of his personal psyche. Justices are usually sufficiently
eloquent and learned to write persuasive, even if occasionally ipse dixit
or sophistical, opinions in support of their convictions, albeit in direct
conflict with each other. In effect, a Justice is really enunciating his
own social, moral, political, or economic policies, no matter how
instinctively or cleverly he cocoons his conclusions with jurisprudential,
10. See Stone, Law And Society In The Age of Roscoe Pound, A4 Memorial, I ISRAEL L.
173-221 (1966), for an excellent and well-documented and annontated review of sociological
jurisprudence during the "Golden Age of Pound" (as Stone expresses it).
REV.
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constitutional, or legal logic and principles." Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes put it succinctly when he quoted Chief Justice Taft's
definition of a constitutional lawyer as "one who had abandoned the
practice of the law and had gone into politics."'"
Many theories of constitutional interpretation have been
expounded: activism or self-restraint; new legality, new jurisprudence,
and liberal interpretation differentiated from old legality, old
jurisprudence, and strict interpretation; federalism versus states' rights,
the latter being defined as the reservation to the people and states of
all powers not expressly delegated to the Federal Government nor
expressly prohibited to the states; living law and justice as opposed to
a search of history for original intention, with abstract rules,
technicalities and traditional, mechanical limits on judicial action;
supremacy of the Court as a third, superior legislative chamber and as
a continuing constitutional convention distinguished from a separation
of powers in a federal system of diffusion among the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches. And 'so the controversy continues,
with the Justices categorized as conservatives, liberals, or shifting, inbetween moderates. 3 We should also remember that even though we
agree today with the attitudes of the Justices, we may disagree
tomorrow when either the Justices or we change moral, social, political,
or economic, and consequently constitutional, concepts.
It becomes vitally essential, then, in order for the Court to speak
ably and wisely, that the best selections possible of Justices be
made-really a subtle addition to the system of checks and balances.
We have been fortunate in many appointments to the Court, but it is
not prudent to continue to gamble on good luck with Presidents and
their choices of Justices or on the benevolent objectivity of the Senate
in its confirmations. The risks to society are too great. In any event,
the quality of a number.of such appointments, even if not bad, could
have been much improved. This power of the President is ineluctably
becoming ossified with party politics, traditions of geography, race and
11. Even so sincere and experienced a Justice as Hugo L. Black can be guilty of
camouflaging his reasons when he says, "[lit is language and history that are the crucial factors

which influence me in interpreting the Constitution-not reasonableness or desirability as
determined by Justices of the Supreme Court", ignoring that it is really his own convictions of

what constitutes reasonableness or desirability which in fact control his conclusions as to the
correct interpretation of "language and history." H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 8 (1968).
12. 2 M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 625 (1951).
13. See, e.g., Harlan & Stewart, Robert H. Jackson's Influence on Federal State
Relationships, 23 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 7 (1968); Mason, JudicialRestraint and JudicialDuty:
An HistoricDichotomy, 38 N.Y.S.B.J. 216 (1966). Both articles contain helpful footnotes.
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religion, misguided feelings of loyalty and friendship, and the very
quantity of the many thousands of eligibles to cull for the best. The
most powerful temporal office in the world has become too busy and
burdened for its occupant to devote the necessary time and attention
to this task. It would also seem that any President would welcome
relief from the political maneuverings constantly cornering him when
he is selecting Justices and other federal judges. One helpful fact should
be noticed en passant; by tacit understanding between the Senate and
the President, the custom of "senatorial courtesy" (castigatingly
characterized as "senatorial discourtesy" in an editorial of The New
York Times) 4 has not been applied to the Supreme Court. So, the
wardheeler tactics of political wheeling and dealing do not usually, or
at least do not necessarily, becloud the appointment and confirmation
of Justices.
The following is a suggested revision of the judicial appointment
process. It is made not only for statutory and, where necessary,
constitutional solutions, but also to be put into effect by voluntary
15
action of the President.
1. A Permanent Judicial Panel (the Panel) for the selection of federal
justices and judges should be created with the Chief Justice as chairman
(having no vote unless the Panel should be equally divided) and 32
members; the eleven chief judges of the United States Courts of
Appeal for the ten circuits and the District of Columbia, five state
chief judges or chief justices, and sixteen others.
2. The Chief Justice, the eleven chief judges of the United States
Courts of Appeal, and the five state chief justices or chief judges will
serve as long as they hold such offices. The other members will serve
for six-year seriate periods (four members in each of four periods),
14. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1968, at 40, col. 2.
15. In 1962, The Council of State Governments proposed amendments to the Constitution
which would fragmentize the form of Government and turn the clock back to the Articles of
Confederation of 1777-a proven failure which was replaced 10 years later by the Federal
Constitution. For a critical summary and blunt condemnation of the proposals, see The Federal
Constitution:Reports on Three Amendments proposed by the Council of State Governments, 35
N.Y.S.B.J. 458-72 (1963).
See also Goldman, Political Selection of FederalJudges and the Proposalfor a JudicialService
Commission, 52 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 94 (1968), which discusses the proposal of Senator Hugh
Scott (R-Pa.) for such a Commission, to be relied on voluntarily by the President. Senator Sam
J. Ervin, Jr. (D-N.C.) is reportedly proposing a constitutional amendment that would place the
selection of Supreme Court Justices in the hands of the Chief Judges from each state and each
federal district. This proposed amendment is referred to in an editorial of The N.Y. Daily News,
Dec. 2, 1968, at 41.
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with the sixteen public members appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and with the five state chief
justices or chiefjudges appointed by the Chief Justice, by and with the
advice and consent of the Supreme Court. The Panel should be funded
by Congress and staffed by researchers and experts, and it should have
the right to call on the United States Attorney General and others for
investigations and related data.
3. For every vacancy in the federal judiciary, except for Supreme
Court Justices, the Panel will designate three persons, and, for each
vacancy on the Supreme Court, the Panel will designate five persons;
all by a majority vote of the Panel. Persons designated for appointment
may include members of the Panel, who will not vote on their own
names; no more than one Panel member may be included on a list of
three names and no more than two on a list of five names. The
President will within ten days appoint one of the designees on a
submitted list, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, .with
the right to select others on the list during respective additional ten day
periods, if the Senate should not confirm within ten days of each
respective appointment. If the Senate should refuse to confirm any of
the listed designees within ten days of the date of the last appointment,
the President's first appointment will become final without
confirmation. If the President should choose not to appoint any of the
designees in accordance with said procedure, the Chief Justice will have
the right and obligation to appoint a designee in like manner, but by
and with the advice and consent of the Supreme Court instead of the
Senate, within respective ten day periods after each appointment, unless
the Court should refuse to confirm any of the listed designees within
ten days of the date of the last appointment, in which event the Chief
Justice's first appointment will become final without confirmation.
4. As is now provided in the Constitution, federal justices and judges
will, be appointed for life ("good behavior"). However, removal and
disciplinary procedures for the federal judiciary, in addition and as
alternatives to the present impeachment process, will be prescribed by
the Panel.
III.

NEw

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROVISION

The second major revision which must be enacted is the
modernization of the constitutional amendment procedure. This
procedure (article V) has not kept pace with a highly complex,
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urbanized, and technological modern society. It was originally drafted
to meet the needs of a less complicated, smaller, and slower moving
town meeting and agricultural social order, and it implemented the idea
that the discriminate Presidential appointment of Justices, by and with
the advice and consent of a responsible, intelligent Senate, would be on
such a high level as to prevent runaway authority being exercised by
the judicial branch. For many reasons, really not the fault of any office
or body, bearing in mind the frailties of human nature, this check on
the judiciary is difficult to achieve today. As a result, the greafest
complaint against an activist Court is that it tends to adopt informal
constitutional amendments by judicial fiats reflecting the fluid majority
of the Court, without being subject to the controls of any practical
system of checks and balances.
The following is a suggested revision of the constitutional
atmendment procedure.
Broaden article V (amendment provisions) of the Constitution so that
two of the Judges of the Supreme Court or one-third of the Panel (in
both cases the Chief Justice may also be included) can certify proposed
constitutional amendments to the Chief Justice, who will then be required to submit the same within five days to Congress for action and
subsequent ratification pursuant to article V. But, if Congress should
not act favorably within 60 days of such submission, the Chief Justice
must submit the same within five days to a constitutional convention for
action and subsequent ratification pursuant to article V. There should
be a permanent constitutional convention on call for such submissions
by the Chief Justice or for amendments proposed by the states under
article V, but the convention should be restricted to consideration and
action on such specifically proposed amendments. The convention
should be comprised of two members from each state, appointed by the
Governor for six-year periods, coinciding with those of the state's two
Senators, from a list of names to be submitted by a "Convention Panel"
organized and functioning in each state in the same manner as the
Panel described herein. The convention's presiding officer should be
appointed by the Chief Justice for a period of six years, by and with the
advice and consent of the Supreme Court.
The above suggested expansion of article V will help ameliorate
the current weaknesses in the checks and balances which the founding
fathers so carefully planned to make our Government secure. They
were well aware of the dangers of an unbridled democracy, which
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history had taught them would probably lead to tyranny." Therefore,
the additional protection of a representative form of government,
supplementing the checks and balances in the interactions of the three
branches (executive, legislative, and judicial), was provided by the
designation of an electoral college (article II, § 1(2)) to elect the
President and Vice-President and of the state legislatures to elect the
Senators (article I, § 3(l)). These devices, the framers thought, would
interpose independent, intelligent bodies (the electoral college and state
legislatures) in the elective machinery for the federal executive and
Senate, with the latter also acting as a check and balance on the
popularly and directly elected House of Representatives (article I,
§ 2(1)). The idea was that this would give us great leaders who would
act primarily for the commonweal and not be influenced by or
dependent on the selfish need for votes, so often opportunistically,
commercially, and ruthlessly obtained.
Unfortunately, this finely balanced plan of government became
more and more unbalanced and unchecked, for three good reasons.
First, there was the development of the excessive power and position
of the Supreme Court, as described herein. Second, political parties
(beginning effectively on a broad popular base with the election to the
Presidency of Andrew Jackson in 1828), together with the designation
of loyal political party functionaries as electors to be elected by popular
vote in each state, relegated the electoral college to a rubber stamp
anachronism to such an extent that the electoral college will soon be
radically changed by constitutional amendment, emphasizing the
election of the President and Vice-President by direct popular vote.
Finally, the seventeenth amendment (ratification completed April 8,
1913) changed the method of the election of Senators to one of direct
popular vote in each state.
To restore a viable government, based on the founding fathers'
concept of checks and balances, it now becomes necessary to update
this system. The creation of the Panel and the expansion of article V
are suggested as means to accomplish this modernization. Present
democratic voting and constitutional amendment procedures should be
retained. The proposed permanent constitutional convention (with its
members to be appointed by state governors in the same manner as
appointments are made by the President to the federal judiciary),
including the additional methods outlined herein to initiate
16. See. e.g.. Schmerl, Democracy as Aberration, 5 MICH. Q. Rrv. 33 (1966), for an
interesting and illuminating description of "Our Sacred Traditions, Profane and Faded."
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constitutional amendments by Justices and the Panel, are offered as a
modernization of checks and balances. The framers of the Constitution
really could not be expected to foresee all of the phenomenal and
disturbing developments of the twentieth century which can be so
potentially disastrous to the government of men by men in this Society.
It is pertinent again to repeat what the great James Madison (the
reputed philosopher of the Constitution) said so well, "A dependence
on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
17
precautions".

I V.

CONCLUSION

This article, then, is not a plea to the President alone; it is also a
plea to Congress and, if constitutional amendments are required, to the
states, for a restoration of viable fallibilism to Government, especially
to'the Supreme Court. It is most important to meet this serious
challenge to society with a response which will assure its survival. If
the problem is not resolved, a wonderful way of life may well die under
the curse of fatal infallibility-the same dread disease which destroyed
so many civilizations. There is still time to control the future, but not
if time is dissipated by the endless polemics of politicians compounded
by the destructively frustrating and foolish extremes of ethnocentrisms.
Our need today is for strong statesmen to lead, and not to concensusfollow, with faith, courage, intelligence, and wisdom.
17. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. (emphasis added).

